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ENDING IMPUNITY FOR THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
Benjamin B. Ferencz*
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over the crime of 
aggression has been deferred for reasons that are not persuasive.  Aggres-
sion has already been adequately defined. The UN Security Council and the 
International Criminal Court are linked by the existing ICC Statute adopted 
in Rome. Compromises already reflected in the Rome Statute will be diffi-
cult to revise by new amendments. Ambiguities are best resolved by ICC 
Judges. Nuremberg’s condemnation of “the supreme international crime” 
should not be repudiated. The ICC must be enabled to deter aggressions by 
bringing transgressors to justice.  
AGGRESSION HAS ALREADY BEEN ADEQUATELY DEFINED
A.  From Nuremberg in 1946 to Rome in 1998 
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT), composed 
of esteemed judges from the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and 
the United States, acknowledged that ex post facto punishment was abhor-
rent to the law of all civilized nations. They observed that the general prin-
ciples of justice should be respected but not followed blindly. 
The tribunal was explicit that declaring aggression to be “the su-
preme international crime” was not an exercise of arbitrary power on the 
part of the victors, as has often been alleged, but the reflection of an evolu-
tionary process that had evolved after countless millions of people had been 
killed in brutal warfare.1 “To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in 
defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked neighboring states without 
warning is obviously untrue, for in such circumstances the attacker must 
know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, 
it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished.”2 “This law 
is not static,” said the Tribunal, “but by continual adaptation follows the 
needs of a changing world.”3
 *  Chief Prosecutor, “Einsatzgruppen trial” at Nuremberg (1948). J.D., Harvard (1943).  
1 Tribute to Nuremberg Prosecutor Jackson, http://www.benferencz.org/arts/79.html (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2009). 
2 Trial of the Major War Crimes Before the International Military Tribunal Judgment 
(Oct. 1, 1946) [hereinafter IMT Judgment], reprinted in 41 Am. J. Int’l. L. 172, 217 (1947). 
3 Id. at 219.  
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Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter defined Crimes Against Peace 
as “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a 
war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or par-
ticipation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of 
the foregoing.”4 This broad definition was the basis for war crimes trials in 
Tokyo and elsewhere.5 The Nuremberg Charter and Judgment were adhered 
to by 19 more nations and unanimously affirmed by the first General As-
sembly of the United Nations.6 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jack-
son said, in his Opening Statement: “We must never forget that the record 
on which we judge these defendants today is the record on which history 
will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to 
put it to our own lips as well.”7 Jackson made clear that if law is to serve a 
useful purpose “it must condemn aggressions by any other nations, includ-
ing those who sit here now in judgment.”8
To help implement its plan for a criminal code to be enforced by an 
international criminal court, the U.N. General Assembly appointed Special 
Committees on the Question of Defining Aggression. The definition of ag-
gression was reached by consensus as an integrated and indivisible package 
and approved by the General Assembly in 1974 as Resolution 3314. 
Agreement was made possible by a number of rather vague compromises 
and exculpating clauses of such creative ambiguity that nations with oppos-
ing views could interpret its contradictions to support their own political 
objectives.9 The consensus definition began with a generic declaration that: 
“Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any oth-
er manner inconsistent with the Charter of the U.N.”10 Obvious illustrations, 
such as invasion, military occupation, bombardment, blockade or attack 
were listed, but it was stipulated that the Security Council could determine 
that these prima facie indicators were not aggression and that other acts 
were aggression.11 It was left to the Council to decide whether any act of a 
state was aggression or not. 
4 International Military Tribunal Charter art. 6(a), available at http://avalon.law.yale.ed
u/imt/imtconst.asp.
5 G.A. Res. 95, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1/95 (11 Dec. 1946).  
6 Id.; Benjamin Ferencz, Law. Not War., The Nuremberg Trials, http://www.benferencz. 
org/arts/72.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). 
7 MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL 1945–46: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 81 (1997). 
8 Id. at 85. 
9 Benjamin B. Ferencz, The United Nations Consensus Definition of Aggression: Sieve or 
Substance, 10 J. INT’L L. & ECON. 701, 711 (1975). 
10 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), annex art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
11 Id. arts. 2–4. 
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The International Law Commission (ILC), composed of indepen-
dent experts from many countries, after extensive deliberation reached the 
conclusion that aggression was a customary law crime and “it should be left 
to practice to define the exact contours of the concept of crimes against 
peace . . . as identified in article 6 of the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribun-
al.”12  The ILC also concluded that until an act of aggression by a State has 
taken place, no individual can be held accountable for the crime.13 “It would 
thus seem retrogressive to exclude individual criminal responsibility for 
aggression . . . 50 years after Nuremberg.”14 Those who argue for greater 
certainty fail to note that many valid criminal statutes contain vague phras-
es, such as “fair trial,” “due process,” and similar clauses that require judi-
cial interpretation. Indeed, the Rome Statute itself limits its jurisdiction to 
“the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole.”15 War crimes include “outrages against personal dignity.”16 Such 
nebulous descriptions have remained uncontested even though they would 
hardly qualify as models of legal precision. The argument that aggression 
can not be tried by the ICC because the crime has not been adequately de-
fined is simply not persuasive. 
B.  Fiddling with Aggression in Rome in 1998 
On July 17, 1998, in Rome, for the first time in human history, del-
egates from all over the world voted overwhelmingly to create an interna-
tional criminal court. The crime of aggression was listed, in Article 5 (1), as 
one of the four core crimes, following genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes.17 But then a most unusual and unique temporary restriction 
blocked the court from exercising its jurisdiction over aggression. No other 
provision in the ICC Statute contained such restraints. Article 5 (2) pro-
vides:   
The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a 
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the 
crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise 
12 Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May–26 July1996, art. 8, ¶ 50, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996) [hereinafter 
Int’l Law Comm’n 1996 Report]. 
13 Id. art. 8, ¶14. 
14 Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
Forty-Sixth Session, 2 May–22 July1994, art. 20, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994).
15 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court preamble, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
16 Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxi).  
17 Id. art. 5.  
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jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent 
with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.18
The creative last-minute compromise contained in Article 5(2) re-
flected the continuing tension between States that were still unwilling to 
surrender part of their sovereign right to wage war and the desire of weaker 
States that sought protection against aggressors behind the shield of an in-
dependent international court. An Annex to the Rome Statute stipulated that 
amendments could be taken up at a Review Conference, at least seven years 
later, to deal with “the definition and Elements of Crimes of aggression and 
the conditions under which the International Criminal Court shall exercise 
its jurisdiction with regard to this crime . . . with a view to arriving at an 
acceptable provision on the crime of aggression for inclusion in this Sta-
tute.”19 In 2002, the ASP created a Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression, open to all nations, to consider what should be done about the 
temporary suspension of jurisdiction over that vital offense. For years, 
Working Group members argued diligently and quibbled about the wording 
of a new definition. If agreement on an amendment can be reached, it would 
be a valued contribution, since it would end the unjustified allegations that 
the crime of aggression has not been defined.   
The mandate referring to elements of the crime of aggression and 
the conditions under which the ICC could exercise its jurisdiction was rather 
puzzling since the General Principles of Criminal Law dealt with the ele-
ments in considerable detail.20 Many delegates felt it would be better to 
leave well enough alone. Clarification of the elements is still to be consi-
dered.
Furthermore, the prescribed procedures for amendments were nei-
ther simple nor clear. An overwhelming majority of seven-eighths of the 
Parties might have to agree before any amendment would be legally effec-
tive. Some nations hoped that such high hurdles might be insurmountable. 
Prolonged debates about the meaning of various words or phrases could 
keep the crime of aggression in legal limbo forever. If stalemates could not 
be broken, potential aggressors would certainly not be deterred. Quite the 
contrary, tyrants and dictators would more likely be emboldened to flaunt 
their immunity by defiant acts of aggressive war.  
18 Id. art 5(2). 
19 Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference on Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Res. F( 7), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10 
(June 15, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute Annex I] (emphasis added). 
20 See Rome Statute, supra note 15, arts. 22–33.  
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C.  The Bottom Line on the Definition  
Allowing aggression to be tried the same as the other three core 
crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) upholds res-
pected decisions of the International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg, as 
affirmed by the UN General Assembly in 1946, the consensus definition of 
1974, the recommendation of the esteemed International Law Commission 
experts and profound  judicial determinations many years later. Many re-
nowned scholars, such as  Professors Cherif Bassiouni, Claus Kress, Anto-
nio Cassese, William Schabas, and a host of other highly regarded authors, 
maintain that aggression is already a customary international crime that  is 
subject to universal jurisdiction as a peremptory norm from which there can 
be no derogation.     
The very distinguished British Law Lord Bingham of Cornhill, hit 
the nail on the head when he stated in a 2006 case: “the core elements of the 
crime of aggression have been understood, at least since 1945, with suffi-
cient clarity to permit the lawful trial (and, on conviction, punishment) of 
those accused of this most serious crime. It is unhistorical to suppose that 
the elements of the crime were clear in 1945 but have since become in any 
way obscure.”21
It is the duty of the ICC judges to interpret the Statute and the ap-
plicable precedents and work papers—if and when the need arises. The 
eighteen members of the Court, elected to balance gender and different 
judicial systems, can be relied upon for a just interpretation of the law, pre-
cedents and commentaries. Indeed, the Rome Statute requires them to do so.  
If the judges feel that new amendments or clarifications are needed, they 
can make such proposals to the Assembly of States Parties (ASP). All that is 
required now is to remove the temporary restraints placed there by Article 5 
(2). Accepted improvements are surely welcomed, but, after so many years 
of intense debate, it should be obvious that the crime of aggression has al-
ready been adequately discussed and improvements are not really necessary. 
LINKS BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE COURT
A.   Security Council Powers under the U.N. Charter  
Many nations have recognized, in principle, that the International 
Criminal Court—the missing link in the world’s legal order—should be an 
independent juridical institution. Yet, the ICC cannot function in a political 
vacuum.  When the United Nations was formed, after World War II, it was a 
political reality that the victorious allies were not prepared to give up their 
21 R v. Jones [2006] UKHL 16, [19], available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL
/2006/16.html. 
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military power to any untried international body. They assumed the respon-
sibility to maintain the peace but insisted upon a special right to veto any 
enforcement action;22 it was the price that had to be paid to bring the United 
Nations Organization into existence. Amendments to correct inequitable 
Charter provisions, as was promised in 1945, never materialized. Powerful 
states, primarily concerned with preserving their own power, hesitated to 
accept the idea that aggression was a punishable international crime. The 
world continues to pay dearly for such intransigence.             
By the time the Rome Statute was adopted in July 1998, it con-
tained several clauses to protect Security Council powers already vested in 
the UN Charter. It stipulated in Article 5 (2) that any amendment regarding 
the crime of aggression “shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of 
the Charter of the United Nations.”23 Article 39 of the Charter directed the 
Security Council to determine the existence of any act of aggression and to 
decide upon measures to restore the peace.24 Neither the ICC nor its Assem-
bly of State Parties has any authority to alter or evade any U.N. Charter 
obligations. It was argued that the SC mandate was not exclusive and the 
U.N. Charter related only to acts of States and had nothing to do with indi-
vidual criminal culpability. The International Law Commission, which in-
cluded experts from powerful states, concluded that until an act of aggres-
sion by a State had occurred, no individual could be held accountable for 
the crime.25 According to the ILC, conviction by the ICC was dependent 
upon a prior determination by the Security Council. You could not have one 
without the other. It must not be forgotten that the ICC has no enforcement 
powers of its own. For assistance in investigations or apprehension of de-
fendants it depends upon cooperation from national states or support by the 
Security Council. Enforcement measures require concurring votes of all five 
Permanent Members (U.S., U.K., China, France and Russia) who, in effect, 
hold the reins of power. It was understandable that many States, fearing the 
politicization of the Security Council, were determined to uncouple the ICC 
from SC influence or control—if possible. The Special Working Group 
wrestled mightily for ways to by-pass the Council connection.26 They con-
sidered turning to other bodies, such as the General Assembly or other in-
ternational courts to decide whether a State has committed aggression. Each 
22 Although the Security Council “veto power” is not explicit in the U.N. Charter, the fact 
that Security Council decisions on substantive matters require the concurring votes of all five 
permanent members implies such a power. See U.N. Charter art. 27(3). 
23 Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 5(2).  
24 Id. art. 39.  
25 Int’l Law Comm’n 1996 Report, supra note 12, art. 8, ¶ 14.  
26 See International Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, Report of the Special 
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 20, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ICC-ASP-7-SWGCA-2%20English.pdf. 
2009] ENDING IMPUNITY FOR THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 287
alternative option posed new problems. How other agencies or courts might 
react was complicated and unpredictable. The U.N. General Assembly 
would hardly qualify as an objective non-political forum. After considerable 
discussion about how to avoid abuse of the vested power of the Security 
Council, no generally-acceptable substitute was in sight. There was no ad-
vantage in trying to jump from the frying pan into the fire.  
B.  Security Council Powers Pursuant to the Rome Statute 
In addition to restrictions that the pre-trial chamber and the rules of 
procedure place upon the Court, linkages between the ICC and the SC were 
integrated into the Statute in the hope that universal participation might be 
encouraged. The Court was given jurisdiction to accept situations referred 
by the Security Council. The Rome Statute also grants the Security Council 
the right to halt any ICC proceeding for renewable twelve month periods.27
Thus, the SC controls a green light but also the red light to halt all ICC pro-
ceedings indefinitely. To be sure, the Council cannot intervene arbitrarily 
but only to preserve the peace “in conformity with the principles of justice 
and international law,”28 Whether ICC judges will be able to consider 
whether the SC has acted in conformity with the UN Charter is uncertain 
but, the linkage between Council and Court has been firmly anchored in the 
Statute.
In addition, the ICC, under a principle of “complementarity,” must 
halt its proceedings and grant priority to any national court that is able and 
willing “genuinely” to try the accused.29 Who decides whether a trial is “ge-
nuine” is unclear. Moreover, any State, whether a member of the Security 
Council or not, can divest the ICC of power by simply incorporating the 
Rome Statute into its own domestic legislation, thereby reserving for itself 
the right to try its own nationals in its own courts.30   
To placate those who were still not ready to accept ICC jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression, the Rome Delegates finally agreed to a last 
minute saving compromise that led to protracted debates about what it really 
meant. The complicated and obtuse Article 121 seemed to say that in addi-
tion to the high hurdle of seven-eighths of the delegates generally having to 
agree on amendments, no State Party would be bound by an amendment on 
aggression unless it also specifically accepted the change by formal ratifica-
tion.31 Many persons argued against a broad interpretation that undermined 
the basic purpose of the ICC. In the end, giving States the option not to be 
27 Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 16.  
28 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1. 
29 Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 17(1)(a).  
30 Id. art. 17(1)(a)–(b).  
31 Id. art 121 (4)-(6). 
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bound was a price that had to be paid to gain acceptance in Rome from na-
tions that were determined to retain the right to go to war. Thus, it came 
about that all State Parties, and probably non-Parties, were enabled to avoid 
ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression simply by doing nothing.  
There is a delicate balance between Court and Council. It should be 
clear to members of the Security Council and their friends that no more pro-
tection is really needed than what they already possess in both the U.N. 
Charter and the Rome Statute itself.32 Nations that nevertheless insist on 
additional guarantees inevitably generate suspicion and hostility. On the 
other hand, forgoing new demands for more restraints on the ICC should 
earn appreciation and good will instead of fears and resentment. The SC 
could be seen as a partner of the ICC instead of an adversary—which is as it 
should be. The notion of a completely independent ICC is a mirage. 
C. Misguided Fears  
Despite assurances built into the U.N. Charter and the Rome Sta-
tute, some powerful States still hesitate to accept the jurisdiction of any new 
legal institutions to deter aggression. Outdated notions of national sove-
reignty in an interdependent world obscure the need for change.  As long as 
the military may be required to act with armed force in situations which 
political leaders proclaim are purely defensive or humanitarian, command-
ing officers can hardly be expected to welcome the existence of any interna-
tional court to test the legality of their military action. Their concerns are 
fully understandable but very short-sighted. There can be no doubt that the 
best way to protect the lives of those who serve in the armed forces, (as well 
as countless civilian victims,) is to deter the crime of aggressive war. The 
Allied Supreme Commander of World War Two, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
after he became President of the United States, warned the nation that “the 
world no longer has a choice between force and law. If civilization is to 
survive, it must choose the rule of law.”33 Eisenhower’s advice was repeated 
in the memoirs of General Douglas MacArthur, commander of forces in the 
Pacific, as well as very many others—past and present—who have expe-
rienced the indescribable horrors of warfare. For their own self-interest, all 
nations must try to stop glorifying war and turn instead to the rule of law.  
It may be that the Council will not respond to a request from the 
Prosecutor for guidance whether an act of aggression has occurred. Even if 
the Council fails to live up to its Charter responsibilities, the indictment will 
serve a useful purpose. Aggressors should realize that there is a possibility 
32 See Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 16 (stating that although no ICC proceeding may 
commence or proceed for a period of twelve months following a Security Council resolution, 
the Security Council may renew its resolution). 
33 President Calls Law Key to World Peace, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1958, at 14. 
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of trial before the ICC. The deterrent effect, no matter how modest, is an 
improvement over the present immunity. Surely, something is better than 
nothing. Even if the aggression issue lies dormant on the Council shelf, the 
Prosecutor need not remain helpless. National leaders suspected of planning 
or committing the crime of aggression may simultaneously be charged with 
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes—which carry the same maxi-
mum sentence as aggression. There has never been a war without atrocities.  
ICC trials for crimes other than aggression do not require any prior permis-
sion from the Security Council. SC failure to react to aggression is bound to 
evoke public outrage.  The court of public opinion, informed by new means 
of instantaneous worldwide communication, is a powerful force which can-
not long be ignored or suppressed. The “shame factor” may be the most 
effective enforcement tool available to the ICC.34
The UN Charter prohibits the use of armed force without Security 
Council approval. Violent disputes that seem irreconcilable are best re-
solved by a court of law competent to administer justice and hold lawbreak-
ers to account. To be sure, there have been occasions where the Council was 
politically paralyzed and force was needed to save human lives. The rules 
for justified humanitarian intervention and the criteria for legitimacy are 
still in formative stages. Nevertheless, there is ample room in the existing 
ICC Statute to cope with illegal acts that might be morally justifiable.  In-
venting new legal terminology to evade criminality, such as calling it “soft 
law” or “illegal but legitimate” or a “responsibility to protect” can be a dan-
gerous practice. The ICC Statute recognizes that there may be many valid 
moral reasons, including intent and knowledge, for limiting criminal re-
sponsibility or mitigating punishment.35 The Prosecutor, subject to control 
of judges, can decide not to prosecute if it “would not serve the interests of 
justice.”36 Judges can acquit and the SC has no say in the matter. Court sen-
tences must “take into account such factors as the gravity of the crime and 
the individual circumstances of the convicted person.”37  The ICC recogniz-
es that morality and law go hand in hand. The world legal order is jeopar-
dized every time any nation, unilaterally or in coalitions, takes the law into 
its own hands.   
34 See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Speaking Frankly about the Crime of Aggression: Reconcil-
ing Legitimate Concerns and Removing the Lock from the Courthouse Door, May 10, 2008, 
http://www.benferencz.org/arts/93b.html. 
35 Rome Statute, supra note 15, arts. 30, 31.  
36 Id. art. 53(1)(c).  
37 Id. art. 78.  
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The mandate of the Rome Annex related primarily to the definition 
of aggression and the relationship between Court and Council. The more 
amendments that are offered for consideration at the Review Conference, 
the more difficult it will be to focus on “the supreme crime” of aggression. 
Many scholarly books and articles have been written by learned professors 
and others offering good suggestions on how to improve the ICC Statute.38
Of course, any amendment that can gain the support of the ASP and remove 
the Article 5 (2) lock from the courthouse door should be embraced as a 
significant victory. The test is not whether a proposal is perfect, but rather 
with it can meet the high threshold of acceptability.   
Failure to allow the ICC to punish aggression is a repudiation of 
Nuremberg and a step backward in the development of international crimi-
nal law. Acknowledging that the ICC and the Security Council are inevita-
bly linked sacrifices nothing that has not already been conceded. What it 
gains is to enable the ICC to deter or bring to justice those leaders guilty of 
the crime of aggression. Prohibiting the ICC from exercising its jurisdiction 
is an indefinite guarantee of continuing immunity for future aggressors. The 
result is self-defeating and counter-productive since it produces just the 
opposite of what those who support the ICC hoped to achieve. 
If agreement cannot be reached with respect to competing propos-
als, the only alternative available to fulfill the mandate to include aggression 
within the active jurisdiction of the Court would be simply to delete Para-
graph (2) of Article 5.39 Nothing more is needed.  
Giving an international criminal tribunal effective jurisdiction over 
aggression, even if it seems remote today, would be an historical achieve-
ment of incalculable significance. Every legal step should be taken that 
might help deter nations from the incredible horrors of armed conflicts.  
Aggressors should not be granted a renewed license to wage illegal wars 
with impunity.  
The most important accomplishment of the Nuremberg trials was 
the condemnation of illegal war-making as the supreme international crime. 
That great step forward in the evolution of international humanitarian law 
must not be discarded or allowed to wither. Insisting that wars cannot be 
prevented is a self-defeating prophecy of doom that repudiates the rule of 
law. Nuremberg was a triumph of Reason over Power. Allowing aggression 
to remain unpunishable would be a triumph of Power over Reason. 
38 See, e.g., the works of M. Cherif Bassiouni, William Schabas, and Antonio Cassese.  
39 Under the Rules of Procedure, the President of the ASP can decide if a matter is subs-
tantive or procedural. See Rules 63 and 64. An argument can be made that removing a tem-
porary suspension in Article 5(2) is procedural; hence only a simple majority is needed for 
adoption.   
